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Abstract. A supply chain is a set of organizations directly linked by
ﬂows of services from suppliers to customers. Supply chain activities
range from the ordering and receipt of raw materials to the production
and distribution of ﬁnished goods. Supply chain management is the
integration of key activities across a supply chain for the purposes
of building competitive infrastructures, synchronizing supply with
demand, and leveraging worldwide logistics. This paper addresses the
challenges created by supply chain management towards improving
long-term performance of companies. It presents a multi-agent supply
chain system composed of multiple software agents, each responsible
for one or more supply chain activities, and each interacting with other
agents in the execution of their responsibilities. Additionally, this paper
presents the key features of a negotiation model for software agents.
The model handles bilateral multi-issue negotiation and incorporates
an alternating oﬀers protocol, a set of logrolling strategies, and a set of
negotiation tactics.
Keywords: Autonomous agents, Multi-agent supply chain system,
Automated negotiation, Bargaining.
1 Introduction
Multi-agent systems (MAS) are ideally suited to represent problems that
have multiple problem solving entities and multiple problem solving methods
[3]. The major motivations for the increasing interest in MAS research
include the ability to solve problems in which data, expertise, or control is
distributed, the ability to allow inter-operation of existing legacy systems, and
the ability to enhance performance along the dimensions of computational
eﬃciency, reliability, and robustness. Agent technology has been used to solve
real-world problems in a range of industrial and commercial applications,
including manufacturing, process control, telecommunications, air traﬃc
control, information management, electronic commerce, and business process
management (see, e.g., [11]).
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A supply chain is a set of organizations directly linked by ﬂows of services
from suppliers to customers. Supply chain activities range from the ordering
and receipt of raw materials to the production and distribution of ﬁnished
goods. Supply chain management (SCM) is the integration of key activities
across a supply chain for the purpose of improving long-term performance.
SCM encompasses the planning and management of all activities involved in
sourcing, procurement, conversion, and logistics. It also includes the crucial
components of collaboration and coordination with channel partners (e.g.,
suppliers, intermediaries, and customers). In essence, SCM integrates supply
and demand management within and across companies. The main objectives
include building competitive infrastructures, leveraging worldwide logistics,
synchronizing supply with demand, and measuring performance globally.
Supply chain management in general and multi-agent supply chain systems in
particular have received some attention lately (see, e.g., [1,2]). However, despite
the prominent models proposed in the literature, most challenges created by
SCM are still waiting to be addressed more thoroughly. At present, there is a
need to develop computational tools to help manage the complexity of SCM.
Against this background, the purpose of this paper is twofold:
1. to present a multi-agent supply chain system − the system is composed of a
collection of software agents, each responsible for one or more supply chain
activities, and each interacting with other agents in the execution of their
responsibilities;
2. to present the key features of a negotiation model for software agents −
the model handles bilateral multi-issue negotiation and incorporates an
alternating oﬀers protocol, a set of logrolling strategies, and a set of
negotiation tactics.
Logrolling strategies are computationally tractable functions that deﬁne the
tactics to be used both at the beginning and during the course of negotiation.
The words “computationally tractable functions” presume that agents are able
to compute the strategies in a reasonable amount of time. Furthermore, at every
period of negotiation, the strategies state whether bargaining should continue or
terminate. Negotiation tactics are functions that specify the individual moves to
be made at each point of the negotiation process.
This paper builds on our previous work in the area of automated negotiation
[6,7,8]. In particular, it introduces precise deﬁnitions for logrolling strategies.
It also lays the foundation for performing an experiment to investigate the
performance of agents operating in a supply chain system and equipped with
our negotiation model.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 is devoted to
negotiation between software agents. Section 3 describes a multi-agents supply
chain system and illustrates how software agents equipped with our model
operate in a negotiation setting. Finally, related work and concluding remarks
are presented in sections 4 and 5 respectively.
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2 Multi-agent Negotiation
Negotiation is a discussion among conﬂicting parties with the aim of reaching
agreement about a divergence of interests. Negotiation may involve two parties
(bilateral negotiation) or more than two parties (multilateral negotiation) and
one issue (single-issue negotiation) or many issues (multi-issue negotiation). This
section presents the key features of a model for software agents that handles two-
party and multi-issue negotiation.
2.1 Pre-negotiation
Pre-negotiation is the process of preparing and planning for negotiation and
involves mainly the creation of a well-laid plan specifying the activities that
negotiators should attend to before actually starting to negotiate [5]. Let
A={a1, a2} be the set of autonomous agents (negotiating parties). Both the
number of agents and their identity are ﬁxed and known to all the participants.
Let I={x1, . . . , xn} be the negotiating agenda − the set of issues to be
deliberated during negotiation. The issues are quantitative in nature and deﬁned
over continuous domains. Let D={D1, . . . , Dn} be the set of issue domains.
For each issue xk, the range of acceptable values is represented by the interval
Dk =[mink,maxk]. The issues are also known to all the participants.
Eﬀective pre-negotiation requires that negotiators prioritize the issues and
deﬁne the targets. Priorities are set by ranking-order the issues, i.e., by deﬁning
the most important, the second most important, and so on. The priority prt ik of
an agent ai ∈A for an issue xk ∈I is a number that represents the importance
of xk. The weight w ik is a number that represents the preference for xk. The
resistance point or limit limik is the ultimate fallback position for xk, the point
beyond which ai is unwilling to concede on xk. The level of aspiration or target
point trg ik is the point at which ai is satisﬁed with the value of xk. The asking
price or optimistic point opt ik is the most preferred or ideal value for xk.
Additionally, eﬀective pre-negotiation requires that negotiators agree on
an appropriate protocol that deﬁnes the rules governing the interaction.
The negotiation literature describes several protocols that vary signiﬁcantly
depending on the type and amount of information exchanged between agents
(see, e.g., [9,15]). Simple protocols allow agents to exchange only proposals, i.e.,
solutions to the problem they face. Richer protocols allow agents to provide
feedback on the proposals they receive. This feedback often takes the form
of critiques, i.e., comments on which parts of proposals are acceptable or
unacceptable. Sophisticated protocols allow agents to provide arguments to
support their negotiation stance.
Most complex protocols make, however, considerable demands on any
implementation, mainly because they appeal to very rich representations of the
agents and their environments. Therefore, we consider a simple alternating oﬀers
protocol [10]. Two agents or players bargain over the division of the surplus
of n≥2 distinct issues. The agents determine an allocation of the issues by
alternately submitting proposals at times in T = {1, 2, . . .}.
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The negotiation process starts with an agent, say ai ∈A, submitting a proposal
p1i→j to the other agent aj ∈A in period t=1. The agent aj receives p1i→j and can
either accept the oﬀer (Yes), reject it and opt out of the negotiation (Opt), or
reject it and continue bargaining (No). In the ﬁrst two cases the negotiation
ends. Speciﬁcally, if p1i→j is accepted, negotiation ends successfully and the
agreement is implemented. Conversely, if p1i→j is rejected and aj decides to opt
out, negotiation terminates with no agreement. In the last case, negotiation
proceeds to the next time period t=2, in which aj makes a counter-proposal
p2j→i. The tasks just described are then repeated. Once an agreement is reached,
the agreed-upon allocations of the issues are implemented.
The negotiation procedure, labelled the “joint-oﬀer procedure”, involves
bargaining over the allocation of the entire endowment stream at once. A
proposal pti→j submitted by an agent ai ∈A to an agent aj ∈A in period t∈T
is a vector (v1, . . . , vn) of issue values. An agreement is a proposal accepted by
all the agents in A. The set of possible agreements is S = {(v1, . . . , vn) ∈  n},
where vk ∈ Dk, for k = 1, . . . , n, is a value of an issue xk ∈ I.
The players’ preferences are modelled by deﬁning a utility function over all
possible outcomes. More speciﬁcally, we consider that each agent ai ∈A has
a continuous utility function: Ui :{D1×. . .×Dn} ∪ {Opt, Disagreement} →  .
Accordingly, when the utility for ai from one outcome is greater than from
another outcome, we assume that ai prefers the ﬁrst outcome over the second.
The outcome Opt is interpreted as one of the agents opting out of the negotiation
in a given period of time. Perpetual disagreement is denoted by Disagreement.
Now, the additive model is probably the most widely used in multi-issue
negotiation − the parties assign numerical values to the diﬀerent levels on each
issue and add them to get an entire oﬀer evaluation [16]. This model is simple
and intuitive, and therefore well suited to the purposes of this work. The utility
function Ui of ai to rate oﬀers and counter-oﬀers takes the form:
Ui(x1, . . . , xn) =
n∑
k=1
w ik ×V ik (xk)
where w ik is the weight of ai for an issue xk ∈ I and V ik (xk) is the scoring (or
marginal) utility function of ai for xk, i.e., the function that gives the score ai
assigns to a value of an issue xk.
Negotiation may end with either agreement or no agreement. Failure to agree
can occur in two ways: (i) either party decides to opt out unilaterally, or (ii)
the two do not agree to any proposal. The resistance points or limits play a
key role in reaching agreement when the parties have the ability to unilaterally
opt out of the negotiation − they deﬁne the worst agreement for a given party
which is still better than opting out. For each agent ai ∈A, we will denote this
agreement by sˆi ∈S. Hence, sˆi will be the least-acceptable agreement for ai, i.e.,
the worst (but still acceptable) agreement for ai. The set of all agreements that
are preferred by ai to opting out will be denoted by Si. Perpetual disagreement
is the least-preferred or worst outcome, i.e., disagreement is even worse than
opting out.
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2.2 Actual Negotiation
Actual negotiation is the process of moving toward agreement (usually by an
iterative exchange of oﬀers and counter-oﬀers). The negotiation protocol deﬁnes
the states (e.g., accepting a proposal), the valid actions of the agents in particular
states (e.g., which messages can be sent by whom, to whom, at what stage),
and the events that cause states to change (e.g., proposal accepted). It marks
branching points at which agents have to make decisions according to their
strategies. Thus, at each step of negotiation, agents often need to follow their
strategies to choose among diﬀerent possible actions to execute.
Negotiation strategies are often implemented through a variety of tactics
[13,14]. The line between strategies and tactics often seems indistinct, but
one major diﬀerence is that of scope. Tactics are short-term moves designed
to enact broad (or high-level) strategies − they are structured, directed, and
driven by strategic considerations [5]. Accordingly, in this work strategies are
computationally tractable functions that deﬁne the tactics to be used both at
the beginning and during the course of negotiation. The words “computationally
tractable functions” presume that agents are able to compute the strategies in a
reasonable amount of time. Also, at every period of negotiation, strategies state
whether bargaining should continue or terminate. Tactics, in turn, are functions
that specify the short-term moves to be made at each point of negotiation.
Negotiation strategies can reﬂect a variety of behaviours and lead to strikingly
diﬀerent outcomes. However, logrolling is commonly discussed in the behavioral
negotiation literature − two parties agree to exchange concessions on diﬀerent
issues, with each party yielding on issues that are of low priority to himself
and high priority to the other party [17]. Accordingly, logrolling will receive the
preponderance of our attention in this paper.
Logrolling Strategies. Most well-intended negotiators tend to believe that,
above all, success depends on the creativity to devise agreements that yield
considerable gain to both negotiating parties. They see the essence of negotiation
as expanding the “pie” of available resources, as pursuing joint gains. They are
essentially value creators − they attempt to probe below the surface of the other
party’s true needs to locate mutually superior solutions [12].
Logrolling is possible only when several issues are under consideration and
the parties have diﬀerent priorities among these issues. The parties then agree
to exchange concessions on (part or all) of the issues, each party winning on
the issues he places greater emphasis. In this way, each party gets the fraction
of his demands that he deems most important. Clearly, a theory of logrolling
in complex agendas is of particular importance to both human and automated
negotiation. However, there are important questions still waiting to be addressed
more thoroughly. We highlight the following: which issues will be grouped for
the exchange of concessions? Relevant eﬀorts to answer this questions include
the theory of appropriate exchange and the principle of equivalence [14]. But it
is clear that much more research still needs to be performed. In this work, we
consider the following three subsets of the agenda for each agent ai ∈A:
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• a subset I+i , containing the issues of higher priority to ai (and are also
believed to be of lower priority to his opponent aj);
• a subset I−i , containing the issues of lower priority to ai (and are also believed
to be of higher priority to aj);
• a subset I±i , containing the remaining issues of the agenda (I = I+i ∪I±i ∪I−i ).
Negotiators have frequently something to oﬀer that is relatively less valuable to
them than to their opponent, and thus, the subsets I+i and I
−
i are typically non-
empty. These two subsets contain the logrolling issues, i.e., the issues that can
be logrolled to make proﬁtable trade-oﬀs. By contrast, the subset I±i contains
both the distributive issues (the parties’ interests are directly opposed) and the
compatible issues (the parties have coordinated interests). A formal deﬁnition
of a generic logrolling strategy follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (Logrolling Strategy). Let A be the set of negotiating agents,
I the negotiating agenda, T the set of time periods, and S the set of possible
agreements. Let ai ∈A be the ﬁrst agent to submit a proposal, Ti his set
of tactics, and aj ∈A his opponent. Let I+i be the set of issues that are of
higher priority to ai (and are believed to be of lower priority to aj), I−i
the set of issues that are of lower priority to ai (and are believed to be of
higher priority to aj), and I±i the remaining issues of the agenda. A logrolling
strategy Li : Ti× Ti× Ti× Ti× T → S ∪ {Yes, No, Opt} for ai is a function with





apply Oi(xk) and oﬀer p1i→j , if ai’s turn and t=1
reject pt−1j→i and quit , if aj’s turn and Ui(p
t−1
j→i)<Ui(sˆi)




i if aj’s turn and Ui(p
t−1
j→i)≥Ui(sˆi)











if U∗i ≥0 accept pt−1j→i else reject ,
oﬀer logrolling solution pti→j , if ai’s turn and t>1
where:
(i) p1i→j is the opening oﬀer of ai, p
t−1
j→i is the oﬀer of aj for time period t−1
of negotiation, and pti→j is the oﬀer of ai for the next time period t of
negotiation;
(ii) for each issue xk ∈ I, Oi(xk) is an opening negotiation tactic;










k) are concession tactics, and f
i
k is the
concession factor of ai for xk (see below);
(iv) Ui(sˆi) is the utility of the least-acceptable agreement for ai;
(v) U∗i = Ui(p
t−1
j→i) − Ui(pti→j) ”
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Two explanatory and cautionary notes are in order here. First,
notation is being abused somewhat, by using Li rather than










k ), t). The abuse helps improve
readability, however, and meaning will always be clear from context. Second,
tactics are functions of a single issue rather than a vector of issues. This permits
great ﬂexibility, since it allows agents to model a wide range of negotiation
behaviors.
Logrolling can be insightful or simply emerge from concession making. Typical
strategies that lead to logrolling solutions include:
1. starting high and conceding strategically − negotiators adopt an optimistic
opening position, slightly reduce their low-priority demands (and they
believe are of high priority to their opponent), and hold ﬁrm on their high-
priority demands (and they believe are of low priority to their opponent);
2. starting high and negotiating creatively − negotiators adopt an optimistic
opening position, substantially reduce their low-priority demands (and they
believe are of high priority to their opponent), and hold ﬁrm on their high-
priority demands (and they believe are of low priority to their opponent).
The deﬁnition of these and other relevant strategies involves basically
the speciﬁcation of particular tactics. For instance, the strategy
“starting high and negotiating creatively” is deﬁned by considering
the opening negotiation tactic “starting optimistic” and the concessions
tactics “moderate” and “stalemate” (but see below).
Opening Negotiation Tactics. Opening negotiation tactics are functions that
specify the demands to be made at the outset of negotiation. The following three
tactics are commonly discussed in the behavioral negotiation literature [5,14]:
1. starting optimistic − speciﬁes a value for an issue close to the optimistic
point;
2. starting realistic − speciﬁes a value for an issue in the range deﬁned by the
target and the optimistic points;
3. starting pessimistic − speciﬁes a value for an issue in the range deﬁned by
the target and the resistance points.
A formal deﬁnition of the tactic “starting optimistic” follows (the deﬁnition
of the other two tactics is essentially identical, and is therefore omitted).
Deﬁnition 2 (Starting Optimistic). Let A={a1, a2} be the set of negotiating
agents and I={x1, . . . , xn} the negotiating agenda. Let D={D1, . . . , Dn} be the
set of issue domains. The tactic starting optimistic of an agent ai ∈A for an
issue xk ∈ I takes the form:
Oi(xk) = opt ik + 
where:
(i)  > 0 is small;
(ii) opt ik is the optimistic point of ai for xk. ”
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Concession Tactics. Concession tactics are functions that model the
concessions to be made throughout negotiation. Practically speaking, negotiators
may consider strikingly diﬀerent patterns of concessions as negotiation unfolds.
However, the following three levels of concession magnitude are commonly
discussed in the negotiation literature [13,17]: large, substantial, and small. To
this we would add two other levels: null and complete. Accordingly, we consider
the following ﬁve concession tactics:
1. stalemate − models a null concession on an issue xk at stake;
2. tough − models a small concession on xk;
3. moderate − models a substantial concession on xk;
4. soft − models a large concession on xk;
5. accommodate − models a complete concession on xk.
A formal deﬁnition of a generic concession tactic follows (without loss of
generality, we consider that ai ∈A wants to maximize xk ∈ I).
Deﬁnition 3 (Concession Tactic). Let A={a1, a2} be the set of negotiating
agents, I={x1, . . . , xn} the negotiating agenda, and D={D1, . . . , Dn} the set of
issue domains. A concession tactic Yi : Dk×[0, 1] → Dk of an agent ai ∈A for
an issue xk ∈ I is a function with the following general form:
Yi(xk, f ik ) = xk − f ik (xk−limik )
where:
(i) f ik is the concession factor of ai for xk;
(ii) limik is the limit of ai for xk. ”
The ﬁve tactics are deﬁned by considering speciﬁc values for the concession
factor f ik . In particular, the “stalemate” tactic is deﬁned by f
i
k = 0 and
the “accommodate” tactic by f ik = 1. The other three tactics are deﬁned by
considering values for f ik in diﬀerent ranges (e.g., the “tough” tactic by
f ik ∈ ]0.00, 0.05], the “moderate” tactic by f ik ∈ ]0.05, 0.15], and the “soft” tactic
by f ik ∈ ]0.15, 0.20]).
3 Agents for Supply Chain Management
Multi-agent systems have generated lots of excitement in recent years because of
their promise as a new paradigm for conceptualizing and implementing complex
software systems. Central to the design and eﬀective operation of a multi-agent
system are a core set of problems and research questions, notably [3]:
1. the design problem − how to formulate, describe, decompose, and allocate
diﬀerent problems and synthesize results among a group of intelligent agents?
2. the coordination problem − how to ensure that agents act coherently in
making decisions or taking action, accommodating the non-local eﬀects of
local decisions and avoiding harmful interactions?
Bilateral Negotiation in a Multi-agent Supply Chain System 203
The design problem is focused on the domain the system is intended to solve
in a distributed manner. This problem consists mainly in distributing diﬀerent
supply chain activities across a number of agents. A typical distribution involves
at least the following agents:
1. sales agent − responsible for acquiring orders from customers, negotiating
with customers, and handling customer requests for modifying or canceling
orders;
2. logistics agent − responsible for coordinating the plants and distribution
centers of a manufacturing enterprise: it manages the movement of materials
and products across the supply chain, from the suppliers of raw materials to
the customers of ﬁnished goods;
3. scheduling agent − responsible for scheduling and rescheduling the activities
of a manufacturing enterprise;
4. resource management agent − responsible for dynamically managing the
availability of resources in order to execute the scheduled activities;
5. supplier agents and customer agents − the suppliers sell raw materials and
the customers buy ﬁnished goods.
The agents are essentially computer systems capable of ﬂexible autonomous
action in order to meet their design objectives.
The coordination problem is focussed on ensuring that agents act in a tightly
coordinated manner in order to eﬀectively achieve their objectives. This problem
is addressed, at least in part, by designing agents that are able to coordinate their
activities through negotiation. Speciﬁcally, for the case of a supply chain system,
the agents are charged with executing actions towards the achievement of their
private goals and, thus, conﬂicts inevitably occur among them. Negotiation is
the predominant process for resolving conﬂicts.
Let us introduce a speciﬁc scenario involving interaction between the sales
agent and the logistics agent:
David, the director of Sales, has lined up two new orders for a total
of 15000 men’s suits: one for 10000 and the other for 5000 men’s suits.
Martin, the director of Logistics, has already stated that it will take four
months to make the suits. Together, they will gross over a million Euros,
with a ﬁne proﬁt for the company. The problem is that Martin insists that
the job will take four months and David’s customer wants a two-month
turnaround. Also, David claims that he can’t aﬀord to lose the customer.
David and Martin are discussing and, so far, have accomplished little more
than making each other angry. However, they can resolve their diﬀerences
by negotiating a mutually beneﬁcial agreement.
The remainder of this section illustrates how software agents equipped with
the proposed model operate in the Sales-Logistics scenario. In particular, we
demonstrate both how negotiation evolves and how software agents use diﬀerent
logrolling strategies (and their associated opening negotiation and concession
tactics).
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Table 1. Major issues, preferences, limits and targets (Sales agent)
Negotiation Issue Weight Limit Target Point
quantity 1 0.350 9500 10000
date 1 0.300 1.25 1.00
(5 weeks) (4 weeks)
quantity 2 0.175 4000 5000
date 2 0.175 1.50 1.00
(6 weeks) (4 weeks)
For illustrative purposes, we consider the negotiation process from the
viewpoint of David. There are four major issues of concern: quantity 1, date 1,
quantity 2 and date 2. The ﬁrst two issues are the most important to David
due to the inherent customer demands − he wants fast action on the 10000 suit
order. Also, after a period of consultation with the customer, David concludes
that he is overly ﬁrm about the 10000 suit order (and is willing to wait up to
ﬁve weeks for 10000 suits, or ultimately 9500 suits), but he is moderately ﬁrm
about the 5000 suit order (and is willing to wait up to six weeks for only 4000
suits). Table 1 shows the four issues, the (normalized) weights, the limits, and
the target points of the Sales agent.
Figure 1 shows the joint utility space for David and Martin. The abscissa
represents the utility to David, and the ordinate represents the utility to Martin.
The solid line OCO’ represents the Pareto optimal frontier (i.e., the locus of
achievable joint evaluations from which no joint gains are possible [16]). The
small squares depict a few options for settling the issues at stake.
Now, we take up a few logrolling strategies, one at a time, and examine their
nature and their impact on the negotiation outcome. As noted, it is of higher
priority for Sales to get fast action on the 10000 suit order than the 5000 suit
order. Suppose now that it is of higher priority for Logistics to handle the 5000
suit order (and to avoid the 10000 suit order). These two departments have the
makings of a logrolling deal − each party can yield on issues that are of low
priority to himself and high priority to the other party. Accordingly, David and
Martin can reach the following solution: a 4-week schedule for 9750 suits and
a 6-week schedule for 4500 suits. This agreement is represented by point A in
Figure 1 and provides a (normalized) beneﬁt of 0.562 to each agent.
Noticeably, logrolling strategies can permit negotiators to fully exploit the
diﬀerences in the valuation of the issues to capitalize on optimal agreements. In
this way, David and Martin can pursue speciﬁc logrolling strategies and agree
on a four-week schedule for 10000 suits and a six-week schedule for 4000 suits.
This agreement lies along the eﬃcient frontier and is represented by point B in
Figure 1 − it provides a (normalized) beneﬁt of 0.65 to each party.
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Fig. 1. Joint utility space for the Sales-Logistics negotiation situation
4 Related Work
Artiﬁcial intelligence researchers have paid a great deal of attention to automated
negotiation over the past decade and a number of prominent models have been
proposed in the literature (see, e.g., [4,9,15]. The majority of models primarily
use either game-theoretic techniques or methods from the social sciences as
a basis to develop autonomous negotiating agents. Furthermore, most models
incorporate speciﬁc protocols (notably, the alternating oﬀers protocol) and
libraries of negotiation strategies (notably, concession and logrolling strategies).
However, despite the power and elegance of existing models, we are aware of no
similar eﬀorts to deﬁne logrolling strategies as functions that specify the tactics
to be used both at the outset and throughout negotiation. Tactics, in turn, are
deﬁned as functions that specify the short-term moves to be made at each point
of negotiation.
5 Conclusion
This article has presented a simpliﬁed multi-agent supply chain system composed
of a collection of software agents, each responsible for one or more supply chain
activities, and each interacting with other agents in the execution of their
responsibilities. Additionally, the article has presented the key features of a
model for software agents that handles two-party and multi-issue negotiation.
The model incorporates an alternating oﬀers protocol, a set of logrolling
strategies, and a set of negotiation tactics.
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Autonomous agents equipped with the negotiation model are currently being
developed. Our aim for the future is to perform a set of inter-related experiments
to empirically evaluate the key components of the agents operating in the
supply chain system. Each experiment will lay the foundation for subsequent
experimental work.
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